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Special Verdicts
HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT
After the Normans introduced the battle and inquest into Eng-
land it was perceived that while the results determined by ordeal,
battle, or wager of law were dictated by the supernatural and there-
fore conclusive, yet the inquest was the work of man and was
subject to error. The attaint was used as a means of remedying a
false verdict. It was based upon the assumption that the jury had
wilfully given a false verdict; and, consequently, the original par-
ties plus the first jury were subsequently tried by a larger jury
made up of more influential persons. If the larger jury found con-
trary to the first, the first judgment was reversed and the first jury
was convicted of perjury and was heavily punished.'
Besides direct answers to questions submitted, there were at
least five forms of verdict during the twelfth and thirteenth cen-
turies, viz: (1) Direct answers followed by a statement of the facts
as reasons for the answers; (2) a statement of the facts followed by
direct answers to the questions as conclusions from the statement;
(3) a statement of facts followed by the conclusion that they
[jurors] cannot answer the question put; (4) a statement of facts
without any reference to a direct answer to the question submitted;
and (5) a statement of facts with the request that the judges draw
therefrom the conclusions which should constitute answers to the
questions put.2
If the jury used any one of the latter three forms it was com-
paratively safe from being subjected to attaint if it truthfully re-
lated the facts. When the jurors found only the correct facts, the
entire responsibility for a proper judgment was placed upon the
justices. However, if one of the first two forms were used it was
quite feasible that the jury might draw the wrong legal conclusion
from a correct finding of the facts. If such wrong conclusions were
drawn it was the duty of the justices, subject to the penalty of
amercement, to give such judgment as the facts required. There-
fore, the juries early recognized that by returning a special verdict
they were freeing themselves from determining questions of law
and consequently lessening their chances for "perjury". The spe-
cial verdict was extended to criminal actions. The court had no
1 Thayer, PRELnNARY TREATISE ON EViDENCE 136 et seq. (1898); Morgan,
A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE L. J.
575 (1903); Von Moschzisker, Final Development of Jury System, TRIAL By
Jua 41 (Bisel 2d ed. 1930).
2 Morgan, supra note 1, at 577 et seq.
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right to compel a general verdict, but as to whether the court
could coerce the jury to return a special verdict the evidence is
meager and nebulous. 3
The attaint had grown unworkable as oftentimes the second
jurors were unwilling to find the former jury guilty. In time, the
method of granting new trials was adopted when the verdict was
unreasonable and the jurors were not punished. Also, instead of
the assumption that the jury had an independent, original knowl-
edge of the facts, a converse situation evolved. Now, if the juror
knows of anything relating to the case, he must state it in court;
and the assumption is that, in general, nothing is known to the
jury except what is publicly stated in court.4
VALDrrY OF THE GENERAL VERDICT
In 1794 the United States Supreme Court tried its first jury
case.5 Following the trial, Chief Justice Jay, after stating that
the facts were all agreed upon, pointed out that the jury need
only determine the law of the land arising from those facts. He
gave the courb's opinion and then continued as follows:
It may not be amiss, here, gentlemen, to remind you
of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the
province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province
of the court, to decide. But it must be observed, that by
the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribu-
tion of jurisdiction, you have, nevertheless, a right to take
upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the
law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on
every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will
pay that respect which is due to the opinion of the court:
for as, on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the
best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable,
that the court are the best judges of law. But still, both,
objects are lawfully within your power of decision.6
This case stood both unquestioned and unfollowed, in the
court which decided it, until 1894 when the court declared (three
judges dissenting) that there was no basis for the jury to have
any such right and further, that even in criminal cases the court
had the exclusive right to determine and declare the law.7
As there was no common law requirement that juries should
determine matters of law, it would appear that the jury might
restrict itself to the finding of facts. However, such is not the
case. The normal attainment of a jury is the returning of a gen-
eral verdict. Prior to the determination of the cause the judge
3 Id. at 589.
4 Thayer, op. cit. supra note 1, at 139.
5 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1 (U. S. 1794).
6 Georgia v. Grailsford, supra at 4.
7 Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1894); See Sunderland,
Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YA=s L. J. 253 (1920).
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makes his charge to the jury. This charge is to instruct the jury
with respect to the principles of law applicable to the issue to be
decided. It should be easily comprehensible. Not too infrequent-
ly the charge is a long and/or involved set of instructions which
few, if any, can comprehend.8 Regardless of how precise the judge
intends to make his charge, if there is error in his statements it
will in all probability be grounds for reversal even though the
jury did not comprehend him in the first instance. Even though
we unhesitatingly accept the presumption that twelve reasonable
men comprehend the charge, is it conclusive that the jury's gen-
eral verdict will be the correct application of that charge? Prof.
Sunderland would indubitably answer this in the negative. He
states the situation: 9
The peculiarity of the general verdict is the merger
into a single indivisible residuum of all matters, however
numerous, whether of law or fact. It is a compound made
by the jury which is incapable of being broken up into
its constituent parts. No judicial reagents exist for either
a qualitative or a quantitative analysis. The law supplies
the means for determining neither what facts were found,
nor what principles of law were applied, nor how the appli-
cation was made. There are therefore three unknown ele-
ments which enter into the general verdict: (a) the facts;
(b) the law; (c) the application of the law to the facts.
And it is clear that the verdict is liable to three sources
of error, corresponding to these three elements. It is also
clear that if error does occur in any of these matters it
cannot be discovered, for the constituents of the compound
cannot be ascertained. No one but the jurors can tell what
was put into it and the jurors will not be heard to say.
However, Prof. Sunderland by no means stands alone in his
conception of the general verdict. Circuit Judge Frank,10 while
generally condemning the general verdict method, points out that:
"The general verdict enhances, to the maximum, the power of
appeals to the biases and prejudices of the jurors, and usually
converts into a futile ritual the use of stock phrases about dispas-
sionateness almost always included in judges' charges."
It is conceded that the general verdict, in effect, gives flexi-
bility to the law and may in that manner manifest the mores and
beliefs of the community. But how different is this from the
8 An example of a charge to a jury in a murder case in one instance was:
"If they found that the defendant did, with malice aforethought, project, pro-
pel, and/or otherwise with force and violence insinuate the aforesaid bullet in,
on, against, and within the body of the corpus delicti, then they must bring
in a verdict of guilty." S. F. Brewster, Twelve Men In A Box 110 (Callaghan
ed. 1934).
9 Sunderland, op. cit. supra note 7 at 258.
10 Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 167 F. 2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1948).
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defunct method of "waging of law"?" The presumption should
be that over such a long period of time, since the wager of law
days, there be a more feasible means of attaining justice. Does
the general verdict rebut that presumption?
SPECIAL VERDICTS AND SPECIAL INTERROGATOMES
Special verdicts must be differentiated from special interroga-
tories, or, as the latter are commonly called, special findings. In
the broad sense the finding of facts by the jury in either case is a
"special" verdict. However, a special verdict in the narrow sense
is in lieu of a general verdict and is the sole basis of judgment.
Special interrogatories are questions submitted to the jury for the
determination of the facts and are returned to the court with the
general verdict. The general verdict shows only the ultimate re-
sult of the jury's processes, whereas the specific findings of fact
show the method of ascertaining the result. A majority of the
states provide by statute for special interrogatories.12
Some states define a special verdict as ". . that by which
the jury finds facts only," yet they further state that ". . in all
cases the jury shall render a general verdict."'13 At first it might
appear that the special verdicts were to be in lieu of a general
verdict, but indubitably the meaning of special verdict is in the
broader sense. Several states have made clearer distinctions in
the statutes,14 but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure spell out
most adequately the difference between the special verdict and
the special interrogatory.' s Whenever the special interrogatory is
11 Green, A New Developnent In Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 715 (1927), states
that: "As a scientific method of settling disputes the general verdict rates
little higher than the ordeal, compurgation or trial by battle"
12 Wicker, Special Interrogatories In Civil Cases, 35 YATX L. J. 296 (1925).
13 KANs. GEx. STAT. § 60-2918 (Supp. 1947); MstcH. STAT. AxN. § 27.1019
(Supp. 1949); OLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 587, § 588 (Supp. 1949); RHODE IsLAND GEN.
LAws c. 534 § 2 (1938).
14 Omo GEx. CODE ANN. § 11420-12 to § 11420-18 (Supp. 1949); S. CAROLINA
CODE OF LAWS §§ 601, 602, 603 (Supp. 1946); WYoMG Cour. STAT. § 3-2418
(Supp. 1949).
Is FED. R. Civ. P. 49 (a) and (b). Rule 49 (a) Special Verdicts. The court
may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special
written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may submit
to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer
or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might
properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other
method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon
as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to
enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the
court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each
party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before
the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted
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used, and there is found a material inconsistency between the facts
and the general verdict, the former will control.
SPECIAL VERDICTS
This discussion will consist of the special verdict in the nar-
row sense, i.e., where the jury does not return a general verdict.
Under the common law the jury could return either a special or
a general verdict. Now, it is usually determined by statute. Some
states provide that in an action for money only or specific real
property, the jury has the discretion to render a general or spe-
cial verdict and in all other cases the court may direct the jury
to find a special verdict upon all or any issue.16 While some states
leave the choice to the discretion of the jury17, other states leave
it to the discretion of the court.18 In Ohio and Wisconsin if one
of the parties requests special verdicts, it is mandatory upon the
court to grant the request. 9
There should be a sufficient number of questions to cover
every material fact in issue under the pleadings which is in dis-
without such demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it
shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the
special verdict. Rule 49 (b) General Verdict accompanied by answer to inter-
rogatories. The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms
for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact
the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such ex-
planation or instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make
answers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict. When the
general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the court shall direct the
entry of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers, notwith-
standing the general verdict or may return the jury for further consideration
of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial. When the answers are
inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with
the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment but may
return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may
order a new trial.
16 CA.uV. CCP § 625; IDAHo CODE § 10-220 (Supp. 1949); AT=m. STAT. § 9304
(Mason, Supp. 1946); Mo. REv. STAT. Axur. § 1120, § 1121 (Supp. 1949); NEsR.
RaV. STAT. § 25-1121 (Supp. 1949); NEV. Comnu. LAws § 8778 (Hillyer, Supp.
1949); N. CAROLInA GEN. STAT. § 1-203 (Supp. 1949); S. CAROLnA CODE OF LAws
§ 602 (Supp. 1946); WASH. REv. STAT. AmN. § 364 (Remington, Supp. 1940);
WYOnIwG Con'. STAT. § 3-2419 (Supp. 1949).
17 AR STAT. A.N. § 27-1740 (Supp. 1949); CoNN. GIN. STAT. § 7973 (Supp.
1949); LA. CODE OF PRACTICE P521 (DART, Sunp. 1949); NaW JERsEY STAT. Anx.
tit. 2 § 27-237 (Supp. 1949); VmaoNT STAT. § 1730 (Rev. of 1947).
1sAizONA CODE AxN. § 21-1007 (Supp. 1949); DELAWvAPE REv. CODE 4671.
§ 29 (1935); IowA CODE R.C.P. No. 205 (1946); MAEnE REV. STAT. § 107 (1944);
MorT. RE. CODE AwN. § 93-5202 (Supp. 1950); N. Dax. Rv. CODE § 28-1502
(Supp. 1949); PExN STAT. AnN. tit. 12 § 781 (Purdon, Supp. 1949); TEx. Rutrs
CIr. Paoc. 277 (1941); UTAH CODE Aim. § 104-25-2 (Supp. 1949); VA. CODE §
8-217 (1950).
19 OHIo GEN. CODE AwN. § 11420-16 (Supp. 1949); Wisc. STAT. § 270.27 (1949).
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pute on the evidence. Each question should be worded as to be
easily comprehensible and so stated that the answer will neces-
sarily be positive, direct, and intelligible.2 0 It is always better if
the question is so worded that it is susceptible of an affirmative
or negative answer.
Where a special verdict is to be given, the charges made
should be shorter and less complicated than when a general ver-
dict is to be returned. The only instructions should be those that
are necessary to inform the jury as to the issues made by the
pleadings, the rules for weighing and reconciling testimony, the
burden of proof, and whatever else may be necessary for the jury
to understand clearly their duties concerning such special verdict
and the facts to be found therein. The jury should not be in-
structed as to the effect of any or of all of their answers.
If all the material issues are found consistently by the jury,
the judge will apply the law to the facts found. If the issues are
found inconsistently, the verdict must be set aside and a new trial
granted unless some of the material issues are found in the de-
fendant's favor. If a material issue was not submitted, and conse-
quently not decided, the aggrieved party can not complain unless
he had requested that the issues be submitted. In North Carolina
the issues submitted must support the judgment whereas in Wis-
consin and Texas any omitted issue will be assumed to have been
found by the judge so as to support the judgment.22 The judge
may make an express finding on such omitted issues as the failure
to request the submission of the issue is considered as a waiver
of jury determination. If issues not raised by the pleadings are
submitted and decided upon without objection, the verdict is ac-
cepted as it is presumed that the parties consented to the sub-
mission. If there is an agreed material fact which is inconsistent
with the other material facts found by the jury, the agreed fact
must be considered by the judge as if it had been found by the
jury.2 3
CONCLUSION
Theoretically the use of the special verdict appears feasible;
the jury finds the material facts and the judge determines and
applies the law to those facts. However, the courts have been hesi-
tant in using the special verdict. Most courts have hundreds of
cases pending, and it is pointed out that much litigation is removed
20 P. W. Viesselman, Abbot's Civil Jury Trials 950 et seq. (5th ed. 1935).
21 See Green, A New Development In Jury Tril 13 A.B.A.J. 715, 719, as to
the type of general instructions given in Texas, Wisconsin, and North Carolina.
22 Green, op. cit. supra note 21 at 718.
23 Green, Id. at 719.
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from the courts to administrative boards because of the delay and
expense under the current general verdict system. 4 The special
verdict might be used more frequently to expedite justice by les-
sening the chances for reversals.
Robert W. Phillips
24L. M. Hyde, Fact Finding By Special Verdict, 24 J. Am. Juw. Soc'y 144
(Feb. 1941).
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